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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
Respondents challenge the jurisdiction of the court 
over this appeal, as the order appealed from was not a final 
order. The basis for this challenge was set forth and fully 
briefed in the memorandum previously filed by respondent in this 
case, entitled "Appellee's Motion to Dismiss or in the 
Alternative Motion for Summary Disposition as to Rescission 
Claim." 
iv 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in dismissing the 
rescission claim? 
a. Is an allegation of restitution an essential 
element in pleading a claim for rescission? 
b. Is the remedy of rescission available where 
restitution is impossible or impractical? 
c. Is rescission available where it would cause 
inequity and harm to third parties whoses positions and 
circumstances it changed? 
d. Are Appellants1 claims for rescission barred 
by their delays in raising the issues in question? 
e« Is the remedy of rescission available where 
the legal remedy of damages would be adequate? 
2. Is the trial court's order, dismissing the Appellants1 
claims without prejudice and with leave to amend, a "final order" 
from which an appeal may be taken? 
3. Is the trial court's denial of Appellants' request for 
class certification a "final order" from which an appeal may be 
taken? 
4• Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying 
Appellants' request to certify the Appellants as representatives 
of the proposed class? 
5. Did the trial court commit reversible error in failing 
to issue formal findings of fact and conclusions of law? 
1 
STATEMENT OF CASE AND 
DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT 
In February of 1987, a complaint was filed by 
Appellants asserting that the only way in which two or more 
agricultural cooperatives may consolidate their assets and 
operation is through a statutory merger pursuant to U.C.A. §3-1-
30, et seq. , and, on that basis, challenging the validity of a 
consolidation of four dairy cooperatives, which took place 
between 1984 and 1986. The complaint sought rescission and 
damages in behalf of a purported class (R. 1-2 6). 
Respondents, who were defendants in the court below, 
responded, taking the legal position that a statutory merger was 
but one method of consolidating co-ops, with a transfer of assets 
being another proper method. Respondents conceded that the 
statutory merger provisions had not been followed and 
affirmatively asserted that there had not been any intent to do 
so (R. 197-223) . 
Plaintiffs/Appellants filed a motion for partial 
summary judgment, asserting no dispute of material facts (R. 52) 
and asking for judgment as a matter of law (R. 49) • Plaintiffs 
also requested that they be certified as representatives of a 
proposed class, under Rule 23, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (R. 
8). 
Defendants/Respondents filed countering motions for 
summary judgment (R. 177, 224), as well as a motion to dismiss 
(R. 91) . The parties all filed memoranda in support of their 
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motions and in opposition to the opposing parties' motions (R. 
94, 107, 117, 154, 184, 196, 247, 268, 469, 514, 525). A 
consolidated statement of undisputed facts was exchanged between 
the parties, resulting in agreement on many material facts (R. 
140-153). Two affidavits were filed by Defendants/Respondents in 
support of their motion for partial summary judgment, those being 
the affidavits of Lynn Cottrell (R. 166-176, Addendum No. 5) and 
Douglas P. Larson (R. 180-183, Addendum No. 6). Subsequently, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants filed affidavits of Lyle Tuddenham (R. 239-
242) and Gordon Zilles (R. 243-246). After the filing of those 
affidavits, the depositions of those two individuals were taken. 
When they were cross-examined at the depositions concerning their 
affidavits, they admitted that substantial portions of the 
statements made in the affidavits were not based on personal 
knowledge. Also, substantial additional portions were in the 
form of conclusions, rather than facts. Accordingly, 
Defendants/Respondents filed a motion to strike such affidavits 
with a supporting memorandum (R. 482-513, Addendum No. 8). 
The depositions of the other plaintiffs were taken and 
are part of the record. Finally, the affidavits of LaThair 
Peterson and Leland Anderson were filed by Defendants/Respondents 
(R. 529-547, 548-551; Addendum No. 7 and 4). 
A hearing was held before the court on June 8, 1987. 
At that hearing, counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants took the 
position there was a central legal issue to the case, upon which 
all of the claims Plaintiffs/Appellants were founded, and there 
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was no factual dispute concerning that issue (R. Reporter's 
Partial Transcript of Proceedings, pages 1-3; Addendum No. 1) . 
That central issue, as represented by counsel, was whether Utah 
Code Ann. §3-1-30, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended 1965), (an 
agriculture cooperative merger statute), set forth the only way 
in which the assets of two or more cooperatives' could be 
consolidated. In that regard, counsel stated ". . . but the 
central issue of this case, once you decide that issue, if we 
lose, your Honor, we have to go home. We're through. All of the 
other issues fall" (R. Reporter's Partial Transcript of 
Proceedings, page 3, lines 3-5; Addendum No. 1). 
On June 29, 1987, the trial court issued a memorandum 
decision, ruling on the pending motions (R. 552-554) . The court, 
subsequently, executed an order pursuant to its memorandum 
decision signed on July 23, 1987 (R. 586-589; Addendum No. 3). 
By its order, the court denied Plaintiffs' request for class 
certification and dismissed Plaintiff's claims for rescission. 
The court also observed that since the Plaintiffs had made no 
individual claims, that its rulings on class certification and 
rescission required dismissal of the claims of the complaint as 
they were pled. However, the trial court also took care to point 
out that its ruling was without prejudice to any claims which the 
Plaintiffs themselves, individually, may have for damages. It 
made it clear that its ruling would not preclude such claims and 
expressly granted leave to Plaintiffs to amend their complaint to 
include them (R. 586-589; Addendum No. 3). 
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Also, the court issued its opinion with respect to the 
"central issue" of the case, finding that a statutory merger 
under Utah Code Ann. §3-1-30 (1953, as amended) was not the only 
way of consolidating the assets of cooperatives, but that a 
transfer of assets was also an acceptable method (R. 552-554). 
The court specifically made no ruling as to whether the 
transfer of assets from CVDA to IMPA was wrongful and 
specifically reserved such factual determination, as well as 
related factual determinations, for future proceedings after the 
anticipated amendment of the Plaintiffs1 complaint (R. 586-589; 
Addendum No. 3) . 
Even though they had been granted leave to do so, 
Plaintiffs elected not to amend their complaint and proceed with 
their own claims, but to pursue this appeal (R. 591-592). 
PREFACE TO STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following statement is written as of the time of 
the trial court's ruling of June 29, 1987, and is based on the 
facts in the record at the time. Because of yet another 
consolidation of cooperatives, subsequent to the one in question, 
an even greater co-mingling of assets, liabilities and operations 
has occurred. However, because that consolidation was approved 
only a week before the trial court's ruling, the details of such 
co-mingling are not in the record in this case. 
5 
FACTS 
This case involves several agricultural cooperatives 
which are or were involved in the dairy business. Such 
cooperatives exist for the purposes of assembling, processing and 
marketing milk and milk products. The membership of each is made 
up entirely of active producers of milk. When a member ceases to 
be an active milk producer, his eligibility for membership ends 
(R. 141, 167; Addendum No. 9 and 5). 
The proceeds from the sale of milk products, after 
deduction of expenses, are, for the most part, paid back to the 
members of the cooperatives. A common way for the cooperative to 
raise working capital is to retain part of the proceeds realized 
from the sale of dairy products. This creates equity interests 
for the members of the cooperative based upon each member's share 
of the capital contribution, commonly referred to as "producer 
equities" (R. 141-142, 167-168; Addendum No. 9 and 5). 
When a individual's membership ceases, the former 
member ceases to actively participate in the cooperative, but 
retains an equity interest. Generally speaking, if revenues are 
sufficient, the cooperative attempts to make payments to retire 
the former member's equity interest. Such payments are made over 
a period of years while new amounts are retained from current 
revenues to replenish working capital. This process is generally 
referred to as "rotating equities". An eight to ten year cycle 
for such rotation is not uncommon. Payment, of course, is 
contigent each year upon economic factors, and the former member 
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has no guarantee that his equity interest will ever be fully 
retired (R. 142, 168; Addendum No, 9 and 5). 
Cache Valley Dairy Association ("CVDA") was for a 
number of years, an agricultural cooperative made up of milk 
producers (R. 141; Addendum No. 9). 
During a several year period prior to 1984, various 
discussions and negotiations took place among CVDA and three 
separate dairy-oriented agricultural cooperatives; namely, 
Western General Dairies, Inc., Star Valley Cheese Cooperative, 
and Lake Mead Cooperative Association. The discussions and 
negotiations concerned the joining of the assets and resources of 
such cooperatives to work together in one larger cooperative for 
assembling, processing and marketing milk and milk products. As 
part of such discussions, the potential benefits which might be 
realized by CVDA were considered. Among them were the following: 
a) CVDA would gain immediate access to a Grade A 
market, which it did not have at that time. This would enable 
the members of CVDA, who desired to do so, to become Grade A milk 
producers and receive higher prices for their milk. 
b) The cheese plants owned by CVDA, would would 
have a captive source for a greater volume of milk, potentially 
allowing such plants to operate at greater efficiency. 
c) CVDA would also realize the other benefits 
relating to "economies of scale" due to its membership in a 
larger organization with greater bargaining power, broader 
markets, and common management. 
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d) By unifying with several of its competitors, 
CVDA would enjoy the benefit of reduced competition for the 
procurement of raw milk supplies (R. 143-144, 168-170; Addendum 
No. 9 and 5). 
e) CVDA's liabilities and debts would be assumed 
by the larger organization (R. 143-144, 168-170; Addendum No. 9 
and 5). 
In return, the new organization would realize the 
benefit of CVDA's assets, including its supply of milk, cheese 
plants, and its cutting and wrapping facility (R. 144, 17 0; 
Addendum No. 9 and 5). 
The negotiations among the four aforesaid cooperatives 
resulted in an agreement which was formalized in June of 1984 by 
a Letter of Intent among the four cooperatives, which went into 
effect on August 1, 1984 (R. 170, 53 0, 53 6-542; Addendum No. 9, 5 
and 7) . Such agreement, as well as subsequent agreements, 
eventually led to the transfer of assets and liabilities, over a 
period of time, by the four cooperatives to Intermountain Milk 
Producers Association, ("IMPA"), the new larger cooperative. The 
transition process concluded on August 1, 1986 (R. 144, 170, 529-
547; Addendum No. 9, 5 and 7). 
During this period of time, there were several meetings 
of CVDAfs board of directors where the Letter of Intent was 
considered. The Letter was consistently approved by the board 
with no more than 5 of the 21 member board ever voting against it 
(R. 144, 180-182, 529-547; Addendum No. 9, 5 and 7). 
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The transfer of assets was also presented to the 
Members of CVDA for approval. On December 16, 1985, a special 
meeting of members of CVDA was held at which a vote of the 
members was taken. The members also approved and authorized the 
transfer (R. 429-547; Addendum No. 7). 
Former members, including those still holding some 
equity interest in the four co-ops, were not included in the vote 
(R. 145, 182; Addendum No. 9 and 6). 
As a result of the negotiations and bargained-for 
exchanges of these cooperatives, all four cooperatives 
transferred their assets to IMPA, which was completed August 1, 
1986. IMPA thereafter assumed all liabilities of the four 
cooperatives. Producers Membership Agreements were also assigned 
to IMPA and the producer equities then standing on the books of 
CVDA and the others were assumed by IMPA (R. 145, 170; Addendum 
No. 9 and 5). 
Numerous metamorphosis have occurred as a result of the 
joinder of these four cooperatives. On or about March 28, 198 6, 
IMPA caused certain producer equities standing in the name of 
former members of CVDA to be redeemed in the amount of $1,173,989 
and paid to equity holders. This payment reduced the outstanding 
equities of CVDA from ten years to eight years in order to be on 
the same equity rotation as other producers assigned to IMPA (R. 
145-146, 170-171; Addendum No. 9 and 5). 
The principal borrowing of CVDA from Sacramento Bank 
for Cooperatives has been consolidated into an $18,000,000 line 
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of credit from the Sacramento Bank for Cooperatives to IMPA and 
former CVDA, as well as the assets of the other cooperatives, 
have been pledged by IMPA as security for such loans (R. 146, 
171; Addendum No. 9 and 5). 
Since August 1, 1984, the four cooperatives have 
blended their bottom lines to offset losses from one company with 
gains from another. Consolidated financial statements were 
prepared and joint tax returns filed for the fiscal years ending 
July 31, 1985 and 1986. Legal and auditing expenses have been 
paid by IMPA on behalf of CVDA and the others, including 
substantial legal costs to defend a case filed by Cheryl Vause 
against CVDA (R. 146, 171, 530-531; Addendum No. 9, 5 and 7). 
Approximately 82 former members of CVDA have converted 
from Grade B to Grade A status and have received payment for milk 
based upon Grade A pricing. They also were allocated IMPA base 
or quota which represents their proportionate share of the Grade 
A milk market. These producers did not have access to a Grade A 
market but were able to convert from Grade B to Grade A due to 
the established market for Grade A products which was provided 
through IMPA. This has had the effect of producing more revenue 
for those 82 producers. It has also diminished the revenue for 
other Grade A producers of IMPA through the adjustments of the 
Federal Milk Marketing Order blend price, as a result of a 
reduction in market utilization percentage. Producers which 
converted from Grade B to Grade A were required to expend 
considerable funds to upgrade their facilities, which could not 
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be recouped if the Grade A market of IMPA were no longer 
available to these Grade A producers (R. 146-147, 171-172? 
Addendum No, 9 and 5). 
The producer payroll and all of its components, to 
include quality program, cheese yield formula, milk market 
settlement and others, are all centrally computed and paid by 
IMPA. It would not be feasible to separate the former CVDA 
producers from IMPA for purposes of producer payroll due to the 
difficulty in obtaining funds from producers which would have 
been overpaid (R. 147, 172; Addendum No. 9 and 5). 
The amount of milk production in IMPA's operating area 
has been reduced through the dairy termination program and 
through other causes. This reduction has an effect on every 
cheese or surplus milk plant in terms of operating efficiency. 
Therefore, the milk available for processing in the former Cache 
Valley plants at Amalga and Beaver has been greatly diminished so 
that as of early 1987 it was estimated that the Amalga plant 
could run at only 25-3 0 percent efficiency even with the Beaver 
plant closed. The Amalga plant cannot be operated profitably at 
this level of efficiency. The overhead of the closed Beaver 
plant would also have to be covered. These losses would have to 
be born by producers (R. 147-148, 172-173; Addendum No. 9 and 5). 
All of the milk produced by producer members of Cache 
Valley has been collected and transported by IMPA since 
approximately August 1, 1984. Farm pick-up routes have been 
adjusted to achieve economies and equipment has been modified, 
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reassigned, salvaged or sold (R. 148, 173; Addendum No. 9 and 5). 
Field men have been reassigned since August 1, 1984, 
and have been reduced from 11 to 8 in number during that time. 
(R. 148, 173; Addendum No. 9 and 5). 
Over the period of time since August 1, 1984, insurance 
has been centrally purchased by IMPA for all fleet, liability, 
casualty, property and workmen's compensation and old policies 
have been cancelled. The fleet insurance provided through IMPA 
resulted in substantial savings with respect to the fleet of 
vehicles formerly owned by CVDA (R. 148, 173, Addendum No. 9 and 
5). 
Substantial capital purchases and leases have been made 
to provide for increases to the truck fleet, plant equipment, 
other plant improvements and computer capability, all in the name 
of IMPA. This also includes the construction of a $10 million 
milk plant in Salt Lake County, the financing of which was 
arranged by IMPA. This plant was constructed to process a volume 
of milk produced by those producers assigned to IMPA, including 
CVDA (R. 148-149, 173; Addendum No. 9 and 5). 
Computers have been reprogrammed and expanded to 
accommodate the expanded business created by the assignment of 
assets to IMPA and the assumption of liabilities by IMPA (R. 149, 
173; Addendum No. 9 and 5). 
Since August 1, 1984, when the Letter of Intent became 
effective, the central office facility of IMPA has been sold and 
new quarters have been leased for a period of six (6) years in 
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the name of IMPA to accommodate the increased office needs (R. 
149, 174; Addendum No. 9 and 5). 
Credit arrangements with customers, discounts, terms of 
sale and other matters relating to the sale of products have been 
negotiated in the name of IMPA and volume considerations have 
been made based on the increased sales volume of IMPA (R. 149, 
174; Addendum No. 9 and 5). 
All employee payroll and records relating to employment 
have been transferred to IMPA and are administered centrally by 
IMPA and its computer. The availability of the greater computer 
capacity of IMPA has obviated the necessity of replacing a 
computer at CVDA (R. 149, 174; Addendum No. 9 and 5). 
The profit sharing plan of CVDA has been terminated and 
all proceeds have been paid out. Beginning August 1, 1986, the 
former CVDA employees were extended a pension plan under the 
sponsorship of IMPA. No pension or profit sharing plan now 
exists for CVDA (R. 149, 174; Addendum No. 9 and 5). 
Since August 1, 1984, significant changes have occurred 
in management personnel. Personnel have been transferred from 
CVDA to IMPA and many employees have been terminated with some 
hired in their place (R. 149-150, 174; Addendum No. 9 and 5). 
The corporate entities of the four cooperatives which 
formed IMPA possess no members, no assets, no liabilities, or any 
purpose for existing. These corporations are in varying stages 
of being dissolved (R. 150, 174; Addendum No. 9 and 5). 
Due to the excess plant capacity available in the IMPA 
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system after transfer of all assets to IMPA, certain plants have 
been, or are in the process of being, closed or modified, which 
include the Cedar City plant, the Murray plant, the Ogden plant, 
and the Idaho Falls plant. This has substantially reduced the 
capability of the remaining plants to process and handle 
available milk if the former Cache Valley plants were not 
available. With the closure of the Ogden cheese plant, there is 
no Utah cheese plant capability left in IMPA without the former 
Cache Valley plant. Equipment has been removed from plants and 
sold off or placed in other plants at considerable expense (R. 
150, 175; Addendum No. 9 and 5). 
The cheese cutting and wrapping operations formerly 
owned by CVDA have been utilized to handle cheese production not 
only from plants formerly associated with Cache Valley but from 
cheese available to IMPA from other sources. The reliance upon 
cheese cutting and wrapping capability is extremely important to 
IMPA and its future business (R. 150, 175; Addendum No. 9 and 5). 
IMPA has committed a full supply of raw milk to certain 
customers and substantial supply to other customers. It also has 
committed to operate its remaining plants at acceptable 
efficiency. These commitments were made in reliance upon the 
availability of producer milk to IMPA from all of the members 
assigned to it, including CVDA. A withdrawal of a substantial 
amount of milk would have a tremendous effect on the ability of 
IMPA to furnish raw milk to handlers, to operate its plants at a 
satisfactory level and to provide a supply balancing function for 
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the market (R. 150-151, 175; Addendum No. 9 and 5). 
Not only has the charaterization of these four 
cooperatives changed, but IMPA has also now merged with the dairy 
cooperative, Mountain Empire Dairymen's Association (MEDA) and 
Western Dairymen Cooperative, Inc. (WDCI). IMPA is to operate a 
Twin Falls cheese plant for MEDA, whereby MEDA and WDCI are to 
haul milk to IMPA. IMPA relies on these arrangments for its 
continued successful operations (R. 151, 175-176, 549-550; 
Addendum No. 9, 5 and 4). 
The merger of MEDA, WDCI and IMPA was performed in 
accordance with the Agricultural Co-operative Associations Merger 
statute, Utah Code Ann. §3-1-30 (1953, as amended). On June 19, 
1987, in Salt Lake City, Utah, and on June 22, 1987 in Denver, 
Colorado members of IMPA and MEDA gathered to vote on the 
proposed merger of IMPA with MEDA (R. 549; Addendum No. 4). 
Because by that point in time the suit was pending 
challenging a transfer of assets, rather than a statutory merger 
as a means to consolidate cooperatives, to avoid any future 
dispute, notice was given to all members, as well as non-member 
equity holders of IMPA of the proposed merger and all members and 
non-member equity holders of $50.00 or more were given the 
opportunity to vote (R. 549; Addendum No. 4). 
A high percentage of those entitled vote actually cast 
votes. There were a total of 846 votes cast by members and 
equity holders of IMPA, with current members voting 52 3 in favor 
and 67 against; equity holders 243 in favor and 13 against, with 
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a total of 766 voting in favor and 80 against. This represents a 
vote of slightly more than 90 percent in favor and slightly less 
than 10 percent in opposition (R. 549; Addendum No. 4). 
The 80 negative votes were spread throughout the IMPA 
organization. There was not any significantly greater 
concentration of negative votes among those who were formerly 
members of CVDA than in other areas of the organization (R. 549-
550; Addendum No. 4). 
Among the members of MEDA, 442 total votes were cast, 
with 4 02 in favor and 40 against (R. 550; Addendum No. 4). 
Plaintiffs, in this lawsuit, are disgruntled former 
directors of CVDA. Each was a director through the time of the 
transfer of the assets of CVDA to IMPA. They are as follows: J. 
Rolfe Tuddenham, age 78 (Deposition of J. Rolfe Tuddenham, pps. 
3-4); Willis Hall, age 71 (Deposition of Willis Hall, pps. 3, 6-
7); Thedford Roper, who has not been formally dismissed, but has 
requested Plaintiffs1 counsel to officially remove him as a party 
Plaintiff to this action; Douglas Quayle, age 77, who was also 
elected to represent CVDA on the IMPA board for two years until 
he became disgruntled and resigned (Deposition of Douglas R. 
Quayle, pps. 4-7) ; Joseph R. May, age 66, who retired from the 
dairy business in October 1986 (Deposition of Joseph R. May, pps. 
6-9) ; Gene Brice, age 49, who is now a member, and founder of 
Magic Valley Milk Producers, a cooperative in competition for 
milk with IMPA. When his contract with IMPA expired, he became 
president of the board of directors of Magic Valley (Deposition 
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of Gene Brice, pps. 3, 4-10); Gordon Zilles, age 31, who was the 
secretary, of CVDA at the time of the transfer of assets. In June 
of 1984 his operation converted to Grade A (Deposition of Gordon 
Zilles, pps. 5, 8-9, 11-12). 
Defendant Randon Wilson is an attorney who allegedly 
provided negligent legal advice concerning the consolidation. 
The remaining individual defendants are the former officers and 
directors of CVDA, (who held such positions at the time of the 
transfer of assets) , who were unwilling to join with Plaintiffs 
in this lawsuit, which was filed February 13, 1987 (R. 2-3). 
As members of the board, Plaintiffs were, for the most 
part, present at the several meetings considering the transfer of 
assets. The Letter of Intent for the transfer was approved by 
the board of directors at each meeting with no more than five of 
the 21 member board voting against it. Plaintiffs Gene Brice 
Thedford Roper and Gordon Zilles voted consistently in favor of 
the Letter of Intent. It was not until February of 1987, six 
months after the transfer of assets was completed, two and one-
half years after the Letter of Intent was executed, that IMPA 
became aware that the Plaintiffs1 intended to legally contest the 
transaction (R. 144-145, 181-182; Addendum No. 9 and 6). 
SUMMARY OF 
ARGUMENT 
A careful review of the decision and order of the trial 
court reveals that the issues presented on appeal are narrower 
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than Appellant claims them to be. The trial court's ruling was 
simple and straight forward. First, the trial court ruled that 
the Plaintiffs were not entitled to rescission. Second, the 
court denied the Plaintiff's request that they be designated as 
representatives of a class. Becuase the amended complaint did 
not assert individual damage claims, the court's decision on the 
class and recission issues, required dismissal of the amended 
complaint. However, the trial court expressly ruled that its 
decision did not preclude the Plaintiffs from pursuing their own 
individual damage claims against the Defendants and leave was 
granted in the order allowing the complaint to be amended to 
asset such claims. Apparently because the court expected such an 
amendment, it did, as a guide to defendants in pursuing such 
claims, issue its finding that merger, pursuant to state statute, 
was not the exclusive method by which the assets of two or more 
agricultural cooperatives could be consolidated (R. 586-588; 
Addendum No. 3). 
Because a citizen has no right to assert the claims of 
another, but his rights are only in his own claims, the court's 
denial of the Plaintiff's request for class certification did not 
deprive them of any right. On the contrary, it was merely an 
exercise of discretion regarding the procedural format of the 
case. Nor were they deprived of the right to seek relief against 
Defendants for the alleged wrongs committed as the court's 
decision expressly preserved the Plaintiffs' legal right to seek 
damages. Consequently, the court's ruling only precluded the 
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Plaintiff's from seeking one of two mutually exclusive remedies, 
i.e. rescission. Therefore, the only real issue on appeal is 
whether the trial court acted properly in precluding Plaintiffs 
from pursuing the equitable remedy of rescission. 
Because the court's ruling on the rescission claims is 
the chief issue before the court, it is addressed first. The 
denial of the request for class certification is addressed next. 
Finally, because the trial court did render an opinion with 
respect to the nonexclusivity of the cooperative merger statute, 
that issue is also addressed, as is the question of whether the 
trial court was reqired to issue formal findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. 
Respondents also maintain their contention that the 
order in question is not a "final order" and, hence, not an 
appealable one. However, that issue was briefed in a prior 
memorandum before this Court, "Appellee's Motion to Dismiss or 
in the Alternative Motion for Summary Disposition of Rescission 
Claim." Consequently, the points raised in that memorandum will 
not be repeated here. (A copy of that memorandum is included in 
the Addendum as No. 2). 
The Respondents' arguments on the foregoing matters may 
be summarized as follows: 
1. Restitution is an essential element of a claim for 
rescission. Because that element is absent from the allegations 
of the amended complaint, it is defective on its face. Also, 
because the Appellants/Plaintiffs, by their own admission, are 
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neither able nor willing to return the consideration received in 
the transaction in question, they are not entitled to rescission, 
as a matter of law. Furthermore, the undisputed facts in the 
record establish that hundreds of innocent third parties have 
changed their positions in good faith reliance on the validity of 
the transaction and would be greatly harmed through rescission. 
Because rescission is an equitable remedy, the inequity which 
would result to such innocent third parties makes that remedy 
unavailable in this case. A final point, with respect to the 
rescission issue, is that the Appellants/Plaintiffs did not first 
raise their challenge of the validity of the transaction until 
two and one-half years from the date that the initial letter of 
intent was signed and six months from the date that the transfer 
of assets was fully completed. This delay also precludes 
rescission as an available remedy. 
Whether a case will be allowed to proceed in a class 
action format and whether the Plaintiffs should be designated as 
representatives of the proposed class are not matters of right, 
but are purely discretionary with the trial court. The 
Appellant/Plaintiffs, who all actively participated in the 
decisions and in the voting, were not even members of the 
proposed class; i.e. non-member equityholders who were not 
allowed to vote. Moreover, the undisputed facts disclosed a 
clear conflict of interest between the Plaintiffs and the 
proposed class. Under such circumstances, the contention that 
the court abused its discretion in denying the request for class 
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certification is untenable. 
Strict compliance with the statutory requirements of 
the co-op merger statute, Utah Code Ann. §3-1-30, et seq., is not 
the only way in which the assets of two or more agricultural 
cooperatives may be consolidated. Another method is to transfer 
the assets of one or more cooperatives into another. This is 
clear both from the 28 year history of agricultural cooperatives 
prior to the enactment of the merger statutes in 1965, from the 
comments in the legislative record around the time of the 
enactment of the merger statutes, and from the language of the 
statutes themselves. 
The express language of Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, allows a trial court rendering rulings pursuant to 
motions such as the ones in question, to make such ruling by a 
brief written statement of the decision and grounds in lieu of 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. Accordingly, by issuing 
a memorandum decision setting forth the ruling and the grounds, 
coupled with a corresponding order, the trial court was in 
complete compliance with the rules, and formal findings of fact 
and conclusions of law were unnecessary. 
Because the order in question was without prejudice to 
the Plaintiffs/Appellants1 right to seek relief through 
individual damage claims and because class action descisions are, 
inherently and under the express language of Rule 23, 
interlocutory in nature, the order in question is not a "final 
order" which is appealable at this stage of the proceedings. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING 
THE RESCISSION CLAIM, 
The trial court's dismissal of the rescission claim was 
not only proper, but the trial court would have committed error 
if it had not dismissed such claim. 
A. Due to Plaintiff's failure to plead restitution of the 
exchanged consideration, their purported claim for rescission is 
defective on its face. 
For obvious reasons, the courts have always recognized 
that restitution is an essential part of rescission. In other 
words, courts have applied the basic rule of fairness that before 
a party may get back what it gave up in a transaction, it must 
demonstrate its willingness and ability to give back what the 
other parties gave. The Restatement of Restitution, §65, 
entitled "Offer of Restoration as a Condition of Restitution" 
states as follows: 
The right of a person to restitution for a 
benefit conferred upon another in a 
transaction which is voidable . . . is 
dependent upon his return to the other party 
anything which he received as part of the 
transaction. . . . 
Id. at 255. See also, Peterson v. Hodges, 239 P.2d 180, 184 
(Utah 1951). If the parties cannot be completely restored to 
their pre-transaction positions, the remedy of rescission is 
unavailable. The case of Mclntyre v. KDI Corporation, infra, is 
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a good example. There, a group of shareholders of KDI 
Corporation sought the rescission of a corporate merger. The 
court held that rescission was unavailable, stating: 
The rescinder, however, must be prepared to 
meet "rescission's own peculiar 
prerequisites" including "ability to restore 
the seller to the status quo." 
* * * 
That the plaintiff in an action under the 
federal securities acts for rescission of a 
sale of securities pursuant to a merger 
agreement must be in a position to return the 
defendant to the status quo ante by tender 
back of the consideration received is well 
established. See, e.g., Parker v. Baltimore 
Paint & Chemical Corp., 244 F.Supp. 267 
(D.Colo. 1965). Also, see: Meis v. Sanitas 
Service Corporation, 511 P.2d 655, 658 (10th 
Cir., 1975); Fox v. Kane-Miller Corp., et 
al., 398 F.Supp. 609 (D.Md., 1975); Bowers v. 
Columbia General Corporation, 336 F.Supp. 
609, 613-615 (D. Del., 1971). Cf. , Goldman 
v. Bank of Commonwealth, 467 F.2d 439, 446 
(6th Cir., 1972); Restatement Law of 
Restitution, §65; 3 Loss, Securities 
Regulation 1793. 
Id. , at 597. Accordingly, it is horn book law that restitution 
is an essential element of a claim for rescission. 
A review of the complaint reveals that although 
Plaintiffs asked the court to set the transaction aside and 
return consideration to them, they made no tender of restitution 
themselves. Lacking this essential element, the rescission claim 
of the complaint was clearly defective and properly dismissed. 
B. The trial court properly ruled that the remedy of rescission 
is not available where it is impossible or impractical to restore 
the parties concerned to the status quo ante. 
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As noted above, well-established principles of equity 
dictate that a party seeking rescission and restitution must be 
in a position to restore any benefit he has received as part of 
the transaction. See Restatement of Restitution §65, p.255. 
In Peterson v. Hodges, 239 P. 2d 180 (Utah 1951), the 
Utah Supreme Court followed the Rule of §65 when it held that the 
plaintiff, who sought to rescind a lease, had a duty to restore 
the defendant to the status quo and to indemnify him for his 
labor and resources invested in the property. Id. at 184. 
Where restoration to the status quo is impossible or 
impracticable, courts have held that the remedies of rescission 
and restitution are unavailable. The case of Mclntyre v. KDI 
Corporation, 406 F.Supp. 592 (S.D. Ohio 1957), is illustrative. 
There, the plaintiffs were shareholders of KDI Corporation who 
sought rescission of a merger agreement under which their stock 
was exchanged for the stock of the corporation into which KDI was 
merged. First, the court recognized the basic rule that parties 
seeking rescission must be in a position to return the other 
parties to the status quo ante. Id. at 597. It then considered 
the facts relating to the impossibility of rescission and 
restitution, noting that the plaintiffs, who were only 65 percent 
of the KDI shareholders, could not possibly restore 100 percent 
of the shares exchanged. After so noting, it went on to find: 
...the futility of proceeding on that basis 
in the present case is apparent from the fact 
that defendants cannot make a 
restoration to plaintiffs of the 
consideration given up by them in exchange 
for the KDI securities. Verkamp Corporation 
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no longer exists, having been merged into 
KDI-Verkamp. Thus, defendant plainly cannot 
give back Verkamp Corporation stock 
* * * 
But even this would not substantially restore 
plaintiffs to their former position as the 
former Verkamp Corporation is bound to KDI by 
management contracts which plaintiffs clearly 
do not have standing to set aside in this 
action; additionally, the KDI-held stock of 
KDI's various subsidiaries, apparently 
including KDI-Verkamp, and/or the assets of 
these subsidiaries, have been pledged to 
defendant First National Bank and—allegedly-
-to other banks as well. (Cites omitted). 
Accordingly, we hold the ultimate relief 
sought—rescission—is not available. 
Id. at 597-598. 
The circumstances of the parties in this action are 
similar to those of the parties in the Mclntyre case, supra. 
Here, the plaintiffs are only seven (now six) former members of 
CVDA. As a result of the sale of assets and assumption of 
liabilities their membership and equity interests were exchanged 
for membership and equity interests in IMPA. The affidavit of 
Lynn Cottrell points out that as part of this transaction, IMPA 
procured $1,173,989 which was paid in advance to CVDA members and 
equity holders in order to reduce the term of their equity 
rotation (R. 170-171; Addendum No. 5). In addition, IMPA assumed 
all of CVDAfs debts and liabilities and accepted the transfer of 
all of CVDA's assets, which have been pledged, together with all 
other IMPA assets, to the Sacramento Bank for Cooperatives as 
security for an $18,000,000 line of credit (R. 171; Addendum No. 
5). 
It is obvious that rescission of this transaction is 
impossible. Plaintiffs cannot possibly be in a position to cause 
all of the former CVDA members to return the $1,173,989 paid to 
them as a part of the transaction. They also cannot force all of 
the former members of CVDA to give up their current IMPA 
membership. Clearly, the 14 individual defendants in this case, 
who are current members of IMPA, are unwilling to do so. Neither 
plaintiffs nor IMPA can obtain a release of the collateral which 
secures the line of credit with the bank, and even if this were 
possible, the plaintiffs cannot purport to be able to assume or 
cause the bank to accept assumption by them of the debt 
pertaining to the collateral they seek to recover. 
The additional problems which an attempt to rescind the 
transaction would have created are too numerous to be practical 
to discuss in this brief. However, it will be apparent to the 
Court upon consideration of the factual statement (R. 140-153; 
Addendum No. 9), as well as the affidavits of Douglas Larsen (R. 
180-183; Addendum No. 6) and Lynn Cottrell (R. 166-176; Addendum 
No. 5) , that the possibility of rescission was foreclosed by 
irreversible changes in position made by all the parties 
concerned. 
Furthermore, the Plaintiffs were clearly not only 
unable to affect restitution, but were also unwilling to do so. 
For example, Plaintiff Gordon Zilles testified in his deposition 
that he was unwilling to return the consideration which he had 
received as a result of the consolidation. (Deposition of Gordon 
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Zilles, pages 282-284). 
C. Rescission is an equitable remedy which is not available 
where it will cause inequity by harming parties whose positions 
and circumstances have changed. 
It is a well-established principle of equity that 
requests for rescission and restitution are addressed to the 
equity powers of the Court and that such relief is not to be 
granted where it will cause inequity. Alden Auto Parts v. 
Dolphin Equipment Leasing, 682 F.2d 330, 333 (2nd Cir. 1982). 
The Restatement of the Law of Restitution, in Sections 69 and 
142, clearly states that: 
The right of a person to restitution from 
another because of a benefit received is 
terminated or diminished if, after the 
receipt of the benefit, circumstances have so 
changed that it would be inequitable to 
require the other to make full restitution. 
Restatement of the Law, Restitution, §69, 142, pp. 284, 567. 
The Utah Supreme Court recognized the validity of this 
principle in the case of Toscano v. Social Services, 624 P. 2d 
1156 (Utah 1981), wherein the Court cited the Restatement of 
Restitution §142 as authority for the proposition that a change 
in circumstances such as would make restitution inequitable, will 
prevent restitution. Id. at 1158. See also, Christensen v. 
Abbot, 671 P.2d 121, 122 (Utah 1983). 
The undisputed facts set forth in the affidavits of 
Lynn Cottrell and Douglas Larson establish, without question, 
that IMPA, and, more importantly, many other entities and people, 
(including hundreds of other members of IMPA and the other 
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cooperatives), have so changed their positions in reliance upon 
the transfer of assets that it would be grossly inequitable for 
the Court to consider the remedies of rescission and restitution. 
IMPA has now been functioning as a cooperative with one 
thousand plus members for almost 3 years, and Cache Valley 
Dairy's assets, which were assigned to IMPA have been upgraded, 
improved and fully integrated into a dairy production system 
which encompasses the entire Intermountain region. Plants have 
been closed and trucking routes changed in order to increase 
efficiency. All of the assets of IMPA have been pledged as 
collateral for $18,000,000.00 of debt. Many individual producers 
have invested hundreds of thousands of dollars to upgrade their 
production facilities to Grade A standards in reliance upon a 
market made available to them by the formation of IMPA. The list 
of other substantial changes in position and circumstances is 
extensive (R. 146-151, 156, 171-176). 
In view of these substantial changes in position and 
circumstances, any attempt at rescission and restitution would 
not only be impossible to implement, but would result in gross 
inequity to hundreds of other people. For example, producers 
would be left without a Grade A market after substantial 
investment in their production facilities. Processing plants of 
IMPA and CVDA would be left without a sufficient supply of milk 
to run at efficient or profitable levels. IMPA would face the 
prospect of losing its substantial investment in the improvements 
made to Cache Valley facilities and be forced to consider the 
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tremendous expense of re-opening closed plants. Such economic 
losses would create great economic hardship for the dairy farmers 
remaining in IMPA. In addition, almost $2 million of equity 
payments received by hundreds of former members of CVDA would 
have to be returned. Moreover, IMPA's merger with MEDA and WDCI 
and the accompanying changes, would cause further inequities. 
These are but a few of the many inequities which would result to 
hundreds of people who have relied in good faith on what has long 
since occurred. 
In accordance with the rule accepted by the Utah 
Supreme Court, this court should not consider equitable remedies 
which due to changed circumstances will cause widespread inequity 
and harm. 
D. The Appellants' claims for rescission are barred by their own 
delay in bringing suit and in failing to take reasonably prompt 
action to contest the transaction in guestion. 
A party who seeks rescission and restitution may be 
barred by his own unreasonable delay. The Restatement of 
Restitution has articulated this principle as follows: 
An unreasonable delay in manifesting an 
avoidance of a transaction after the 
acquisition of knowledge of the facts 
terminates the power of rescission for fraud 
or mistake, and the consequent right to 
restitution, if the interests of the 
transferee or of a third person are harmed or 
were likely to be harmed by such delaye 
Restatement of Restitution §64, p. 248. 
In proceedings in equity, a person otherwise 
entitled to restitution is barred from 
recovery if he has failed to bring or, having 
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brought has failed to prosecute, a suit for 
so long a time and under such circumstances 
that it would be inequitable to permit him 
now to prosecute the suit. 
Restatement of Restitution §148, p. 589. 
The courts have applied this equitable principle in 
cases similar to the present case. In Andrews v. Precision 
Apparatus, Inc., 271 F.Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), the plaintiff 
brought an action to enjoin a corporate merger and to enjoin the 
use of corporate assets to pay debts of the other merging 
corporation. The Court denied the plaintiff the equitable relief 
sought based upon a 10-day delay, stating: 
Plaintiff made no effort to attack the plan 
of consolidation during the period from 
February 26, 1963, when notice of meeting of 
stockholders was sent out, to March 22, 1963, 
when this action was commenced; meanwhile, on 
March 12, consolidation documents had been 
filed in the proper public offices. By such 
filing the consolidation became effective and 
rights thereby accrued to third parties. It 
would be inequitable to permit plaintiff to 
attack the consolidation after he had delayed 
until it became effective. Katz v. R. Hoe & 
Cg^, 279 App.Div. 766, 104 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1st 
Dept., 1951). 
Id., at 687. 
The plaintiffs in this case made no effort to attack 
the transfer of assets from CVDA to IMPA during a 2\ year period 
from June of 1984, when the initial Letter of Intent was signed, 
until February of 1987, 6 months after the transfer of assets was 
fully completed (R. 145, 182; Addendum No. 9 and 6). In fact, at 
least three of them consistently voted in favor of the transfer 
(R. 144, 182; Addendum No. 9 and 6). By the time the transfer 
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was complete, rights had accrued and commitments had been made to 
numerous other parties, including the 1,000 plus members of the 
co-ops involved, as well as all of the parties with whom IMPA has 
contracted to deal. It would be inequitable to permit six 
disgruntled individuals to attack the transfer at this late 
stage. 
Harman v. Masonelan International, Inc., 418 A.2d 1004 
(Del Chanc. 1980) , is also on point. There, the Delaware court 
of Chancery held that a shareholder who sat idly by for two years 
while other investors drastically changed their positions in 
connection with a corporate merger, was barred by laches from 
seeking rescission of the merger. The court concluded: 
Accordingly, whether or not it would be 
technically possible to undo the results of 
the two mergers . . . which occurred over a 
two year period, which is extremely doubtful, 
. . . , I conclude that the only feasible 
relief to which plaintiff would be entitled 
is damages . . . . 
Id., at 1007. 
Similarly, in this case, the plaintiffs sat by for well 
over two years without attacking the transfer of assets until 
long after it had been completed. They are likewise barred by 
laches. 
E. The equitable remedy of rescission is not available where the 
legal remedy of damages would be adequate. 
Claims for rescission and restitution fall within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of equity and because they are controlled 
by equitable principles, are remedies which can only be conferred 
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by equity. Ionic Petroleum Limited v. Third Finance Corp., 411 
P.2d 492, 495 (Okl. 1966). It is a fundamental principle of 
equity jurisdiction that rescission or cancellation are not 
available remedies, where the complainant has a "plain, adequate 
and complete remedy at law . . . ." Id., at 495. In Niles v. 
Builders Service & Supply, Inc., 667 P.2d 770 (Colo.App. 1983), a 
Colorado appellate court stated: 
A party seeking rescission must show that 
damages would not adequately compensate for 
the loss, . . . . Dumas v. Klatt, 132 Colo. 
333, 288 P.2d 642 (1955). Furthermore, where 
rescission is granted, the parties must be 
placed in the status quo before the sale. 
Rice v. Hiltv, 38 Colo.App. 338, 559 P.2d 725 
(1976). 
Id., at 772. 
The Appellants herein failed to demonstrate, or even 
assert that damages would not adequately compensate them for the 
loss allegedly sustained by them. Accordingly, the trial court 
acted properly in preserving their right to seek relief in the 
form of damages, rather than rescission. 
CONCLUSION OF POINT I. 
For one or more of the foregoing reasons, the trial 
court acted properly in dismissing the Appellant's claims for 
rescission. Accordingly, it is respectfully submitted that the 
trial court's ruling in that regard should be sustained. 
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POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS1 REQUEST TO CERTIFY 
THE PLAINTIFFS AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE 
PROPOSED CLASS, 
Puv?v;w:2 claims under t IIP format of -a class action is 
'
 !
 - .•' ' v a matter clearly within the . ' -irt's 
discretion.. I .s Court will only consider upsetting trie *r:al 
courts ecisi or •" * '•]•?*•?:-' "-r*"if -it .on whet'*- ",;eje - •. er a 
f
 '*
r
*
r
 *- - can v. City of West Jordan, / 2 " P. 2d 
(Utah 138*: - review cf the undisputed facts before the ;:ourt 
at *:ie tire ~f „,'::- 'ecis^or **eveals -v :'^^r ib^ -*~ : ^ .i ^ /: e*. i on. 
The -; -. : - > - ecord demonstrate that the 
Plaintiffs, the proposed representatives of the proposed class, 
were not truly "representative" of rh*-- :1^?- - ^ qu .*e>: :- r 
example . their . 7-ir.p, -. i: -, :.,>- , <::. ntir rs purported to speak 
f< r :::r^ t-': "?DA members, ^:\o still held equity interests, but 
were not -.11 owed ^ vote (R. V)
 e None of the Plaintiffs vas d 
former me^ be - • • • • • ^ r .t. . xvea to vote (K, 2). 
I *. - :/=: i -. & ;.ntiffs were not only current voting members, 
bur. they were also members • - ne board of directors and r\ri ;eev 
allowed -r- ,. jest.i . several occasions 
(1 . :::::erincre, several of the Plaintiffs no* admit 
that tne> voted in favor of the transaction in question ?'R, .44, 
132; .'. fiolf^ Tuddenham Deposit]-: ,-. 
is. also undisputed thai the Plaintiffs had interests 
conflicting with the interests -;.f the proposed members of the 
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class. For example, Plaintiff, Gene Brice, admitted in his 
deposition, that he had participated in the formation of a 
competing cooperative and, in fact, was president elect of that 
new organization. (Deposition of Gene Brice, pps. 6-9). In such 
capacity, he would be competing with the people he was purporting 
to represent. Also, the Plaintiffs, in their verified complaint, 
alleged that the former officers and directors of CVDA had acted 
improperly in carrying out the transaction in question (R. 1-25). 
(All of the individual Defendants in the case were former 
officers and/or directors of CVDA). However, the Plaintiffs 
themselves were also former officers and/or directors, and were 
serving in that capacity at the time of the transaction in 
question (R. 2) . As such, they were also potential defendants. 
Accordingly, they had an unquestionable conflict of interests. 
It is further clear from the record that the class 
Plaintiffs are purporting to represent are in agreement with the 
transfer of assets to IMPA. Since CVDA and the other three 
cooperatives transferred their assets to IMPA, IMPA has now 
formally merged with WDCI and MEDA. As stated by the Affidavit 
of LeLand Anderson, T.R. 548-550, Addendum 4, all non-member 
equity holders of IMPA, which included all non-member equity 
holders of CVDA, were given the opportunity to vote. The vote of 
the equity and non-equity holders overwhelmingly approved the 
merger. 
Not only does this subsequent development illustrate 
that Plaintiffs are not representative of the purported class, 
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but such develi'-- * .._
 :. entire appeal root* 
J'ne ui;aii Supreme -J^ urt nas consistently neid that i: order for 
the Court to retair Jurisdiction rf *^e arriei - : -- • ' 
the court m^s* « - ^ ^yon v. Bateman 228 
P, 2d « Ly, H . . McRae v. Jackson, 52 6 P.2d IJV"# 1191 
(Utah 1974; *-- stated oy "he Court i-• McRae: 
Althou;: ** i/, _a^e precisely in point nas been 
found • .^rerdi principle, to which we adhere, 
is stateo ;r, o An.Jur.2d Appea) and Error, SS751: 
,f
 The runcti.n of appellate courts, like tr:-t 
of courts generally, is not to give opinions .^v. 
merely abstract or theoretical matters, but only 
•'• to decide actual controversies injuriously affecting 
the rights of some party to the litigation, and It 
has been held that questions or case which have 
become moot or academic are not a proper subject 
to review." 
Id. 
Furthermore, as stated ir'l^ - . ,*;• 23(c)(1)/ an 
order detc-r;r,.n: -.^  .-! i;er <, ca^t- action may be maintained,- is 
not a ri ;••-.. order upon wftich an appeal may be t^Ken. As stated 
in Rule 23 fc) (I- \r — i-?r under this -..;.,: _\ . re-
condition i"..:- r , .. - • - I-A or amended before the decision cr 
tne merits Addendum No. . see also Appellee's Motion 
Dismiss cr . •* tne Alternative Motion for Suimr ; spml;. • 
to Rescission ".-.-* . .: •• 
Under such circumstances, the trial court c3ear3y did 
not abuse its discretion in denying class certif icar i ~^ - . ,n 
fact, would have act?; , -proper * ;^ certified the 
Plaintiffs as representatives of the proposed class, 
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INTRODUCTION TO POINT III. 
A finding by this court that the trial court acted 
properly with respect to the rescission and class action claims 
would render the remaining issues raised in this appeal moot. 
Accordingly, the balance of the issues need not be reached. 
However, because Respondent does not know what issues the Court 
will choose to treat in its decision, the additional issues will 
be addressed below. 
POINT III. 
STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE COOPERATIVE MERGER STATUTES 
(U.C.A. 3*1-3 0, ET SEP.) IS NOT THE ONLY METHOD 
BY WHICH THE ASSETS OF A COOPERATIVE MAY BE TRANSFERRED. 
At the hearing on the motions in question, counsel for 
Appellants made the affirmative representation to the court that 
if compliance with merger statutes is not the exclusive method by 
which the assets of an agricultural cooperative can be legally 
transferred to another cooperative, then his clients1 case failed 
as a matter of law and the remaining issues would become moot 
(See Reporter's Partial Transcript of Proceedings, pages 2 and 3; 
Addendum No. 1). 
Therefore, the Appellants invited the court to rule on 
the exclusivity of the merger statutes, a purely legal issue, and 
to dismiss their claims, as a matter of law, if the court 
disagreed with their interpretation of those statutes. 
Accordingly, even though Appellants now contend that factual 
issues precluded the court's ruling, they took the opposite 
position below. Both in their own motion for partial summary 
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• :*2ar--:-* .• ->i . , .enied the existence of 
materia,, disputes racrs and specifically requested a ruling on 
the very issue ; question '-'^-'- Report-*-* ' - "'art .La J i'ransci'Lpt 
:
r
 "-r'^-'-- • iae:ia~ir. No- J :• . Also contrary to 
Appei.a;/. r urrenL assertions. 'I'.e trial court did limit . ~s 
decision -».- :nferpretat~ . •- * m e xciw - v* ^;.ris; . 
rulxriw • .--•_.ues- :: i- court made :• -..ear 
that tr^ o^ I actua * issues would t e dea 11 w i th -»-: L * -• ' ne 
individual damage r ' air.^ - •• --] i; nt i ft:- ";«**• *• 
}: : * r - ^  - ; ••• ^3b™586; Addendum. 3). 
" :ie,;e: ,:i ... . * :..,- ~-;,^  . ssue, , -e statutory interpretation, 
is properly before th- Court rhis appeal. 
An example * ict,- .-s .e ^n: en remains for 
resolution is the question "i whether the notices and vote o the 
membership authorized consolidation bv a transfer •- f •i^-ts. 
The Respondent- •-:-.-r-?-<l - • - .i^ nidersnip expressly 
a - .•:-:;.*..: ^ *s«r"3 ee Affidavit of iaThair 
Peterson, Addendum No 
A review of the relev.- * *<-:..• • *:s : \. .- \-- , c;ae as 
w- '.' <- e.jfc^ ..f , - ".iStory JI thfjse sections, reveals that 
i' .--> en- Appellants, not rhe trial -x-urt. who are in error in 
the interpretation of rv.^  statutes, 
Strict- .jupticinc* ••;,;. nne merger provisions of Title 
•if'.;e; i the ;:tah Code is not the only way that the assets 
of agricultural cooperatives can be consolidated cooperatives 
may use other ""••.• ;: ;*-• *• -onso, j.uaie a;;a, in fact, many of 
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them did so in the 28 years which transpired between the time 
that the state cooperative statutes were enacted and when the 
merger provisions were first adopted. 
Title 3, Chapter 1, does not state that its provisions 
are the only method of merging and does not state that non-use of 
its provisions is actionable. Title 3, Chapter 1, simply 
provides one method of merger that cooperatives can use if they 
so choose. 
Utah Code Ann. §3-1-1, "Declaration of policy", states 
that "it is the declared policy of the state, as one means of 
improving the economic position of agriculture, to encourage the 
producers of agricultural products into effective associations. . 
and to that end this act should be liberally construed." 
(emphasis added). The "declaration of policy" makes two points 
important to this case. First, the act is just "one" means—it 
is not the only means—and second, the act "encourages," it does 
not require. 
The merger provision itself, §3-1-30, states that any 
cooperative "may merge with one or more agricultural cooperative 
associates. . .pursuant to a plan of merger approved in the 
manner provided by this act. . . .". §3-1-3 0 does not say a 
merger must be in the manner provided by the act, nor does it say 
a "merger" is the only method two entities can consolidate, sell 
assets, trade assets, or otherwise interact. 
The legislative history of the Agricultural Cooperative 
Association Act, and that specifically relating to the merger 
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provision -=- *-
.wL^.^o CJLlowing for the establishment of 
agricultural cooperative ^sedations were oriainally enacted i n 
1937 an ; "i^ ve ex1'" ' .; . *: that time. It 
t ,i- legislature enacted the 
sections ot \-- code dealing witn +*!'ie merger of coroe-'ot • es. 
Accordingly ;cr s ~ ^ ^-: * -'- • - ,; . ur.ct.cned 
\ . z .- - .uars before the statutes m question 
were ever . - existence -jr^ ng r;.af~ oeriod, there \-dcah~edly 
were numerous ^*i;perat :"-- - *^...-:-**-• . . * .. r.her 
c • zver v . . . sierring their assets to such cooperatives, 
Ihf provision : §3-1—* of the Agricultural 
Cooperative Association Act. */v: i r*> v- - •- • --: *.;;*- or ; g±na- act 
i n 1 937 •-*• *" ! ""Lp :^:^nr -t- port or the current act. provide very 
broad powers relating to holding and transferring assets. For 
exampl e, in §3-1-9 •• r* the Act states: 
'*A,w aSSO ciation formed under this 
Act or an association which might 
be formed under this Act and which 
existed at the time this Act took 
effect, shall have power and 
capacity to act possessed by-
natural persons and may do each and 
everything necessary, suitable or 
proper for the accomplishment of 
any one or more of the purposes, or 
the attainment of any one or more 
of the objects herein enumerated or 
conductive to or expedient for the 
interests or benefit of the 
associat ion 
Subdivision (II) of this section provides that without 
limiting the grant of authority r.nt.,aned subdivision (I) 
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(above), certain powers were specifically provided for each 
agricultural cooperative, this subdivision of the Act then 
contains subparagraphs (a)-(n), each containing very broadly 
worded language. Included in that language is the power to 
"sell, dispose of, pledge, or mortgage any property," (see 
subparagraph (f)). 
The very broad powers provided in subdivision (I) , as 
well as the specifically enumerated powers in subdivision (II) , 
indisputably grant sufficient power to an agricultural co-op to 
transfer its assets. This fact is confirmed by the language of 
such provisions as well as by the numerous transfers which 
occurred in the 28 years preceding enactment of the merger 
section. This fact is also confirmed clearly by the legislative 
history, as reflected in the comments of Senator Harwood, when he 
presented the merger statutes on the floor of the Senate in 1965. 
In that presentation, he expressly stated: 
"Evidently there has not been 
provided the means for corporations 
and cooperatives--agricultural 
cooperatives—-to merge, as such, 
one into another without the 
tedious procedure of either buying 
assets or buying stock or some 
other means that sometimes makes it 
difficult or even impossible." 
(See Transcript of Legislative 
History, page 13). 
Therefore, the enactment of the merger statutes were 
never intended to provide the exclusive means for consolidating 
cooperatives, but merely as an alternative to the "tedious 
procedure of buying assets." It follows, therefore, that if a 
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:o jper?" : "r ;s . > proce^u.-e of 
' • ^r.sit;, .-._. :-: uoseta.. * .-- f;jowerea v.n dc so 3;n t::t "rial 
court properly ,*•. 
There :~ •: -^„, . •.- V., /ering whether, in the 
-..-T- * . .:4e^c; statute-: ^ r e followed, as Defendants 
admit t n ci r r.\e/ v^-- . h«- transaction m question .vets 
handled by way of i transfer .^ ,:;J„T> :-0* ., . s:atutory 
merger, Whether j»tuper procedures w^re used m effectinq tr:at 
transfer is one of the factual issues which the- tria!: ?ourt 
expressly reserved and, consequent!*- *-,.*• ;s^-;.-i • v- : .-re 
the cou r t cn t. (11 s appea ,1 . 
A. In deciding an issue of first impression, the court should 
look not only to the legal issue itselr.,_pat., to ine equitable and 
practica^ ^ eriect ui J.L&> decision. 
The issue before the Court is one of first impression. 
This !s apparently due . .,*- fa^t fha^ *• ••** -^ pprc-v 
consolidating c:-r,r- . * • arjsfei issets nas never previously 
t>- .ra_,engeci. Because tne issue is one of first impression
 t 
the Court is in a position to establish the ac-fclieah'e - :•.-
subject* Any i.;n<- -* ~ »-•* -.* ,. .^ r^ e.i, it. ;s appropriate to 
consij^r - • £• •vquit^bj.e and practical impact of such law. 
The P3ai.nt.iffs have taken a very inequitable . ega] 
position in this .rase l essen - -: ^  -orxandir :i r-hat 
the> - '.eiur>ers -. .-* ..;.e . ailey Dairy Association, should oe 
a*LoT*ed tc retain the benefits of the consolidation with '^&stf*rn 
Genera.], a;-^  the other members * * -.,- . <- >rtj.;i^ oacK the 
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consideration which they gave. The inequity of the Plaintiffs1 
position is perhaps most graphically demonstrated by three 
excepts from the deposition of Plaintiff, Gordon Zilles: 
"Q. I'm going to refer you now to Exhibit 7. 
Want me to help you find that? 
MR. DAINES: Have you them in order, Mr. 
Eyre? 
MR. EYRE: Yes. They're in order. 
MR. DAINES: I'd be happy to find them one by 
one as we go through this again. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. I have it. 
Q. (Mr. Christensen) The second paragraph 
from the top, apparently Mr. Rich in a memo 
makes the statement, "As you all know, from 
the standpoint of financial statements we are 
not in a good position." Do you know whether 
that was a truthful statement as of February 
13, 1984? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. What were the financial concerns at that 
time as you recall them? 
A. As I recall them at this time, we had 
just opened up a new plant, and through that 
year we had experienced a great deal of 
startup costs, starting up new equipment, 
making bad cheese, having to sell bad cheese 
at a reduced rate. All the necessary 
concerns that comes from putting a new 
facility on the line. As a result, we were 
really hurting at that time financially. I 
don't know if you would say really hurting, 
but we were not showing a* profit that we had 
other years. 
Q. Was this also something that from your 
perception made an arrangement with Western 
General somewhat attractive at that period? 
A. The thing that made the attraction to go 
with, begin some discussion with Western 
General, was two things. One is it gave 
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j-r jsiUwd..* like myself an opportunity to get 
on the A grade market. And the second thing 
was that the surplus milk gave us an 
opportunity to run it through the Cache 
Valley plant. Also, we felt that there was a 
possibility of some savings in trucking by 
not having to follow each other around, 
Q. So some potential cost efficiencies by 
having one company picking up milk in the 
same area rather than two companies running 
two different sets of truck" 
r That * s correct, TMa- 's correct 
Qe Luc , ^  i*cw^  an ^ndBrsucinding as to what 
the attraction was from Western General's 
side? 
A.. The attraction as I would understand i\, 
and as I had talked to their directors, is 
they wanted the cheese plant really bad. the 
reason they wanted that cheese plant, is 
after we got into the negotiation of this T 
found out that they was selling cheese at 
three cents a pound below what Cache Valley 
Dairy was, which would equal to a regular 
farm about 3 0 to 4 0 cents. So it was very 
attractive to them to be able to market. 4 0 to 
50 percent of their milk through cheese 
through a better source." (Zilles 
Deposition, pages 112-114.; 
Later iri Mr. Zilles1 deposition, he testified as 
follows: 
"Q. Jusi to urient us on time frame, I'm 
going to refer you to the November 27, 1985 
vote of the board of directors of Cache-
Valley Dairy. That was the one we discussed 
earlier. It was a 20 to one vote. You and I 
discussed it, concluded it; was probably 
really a 19 to one vote, ^ vera Know what 
I'm talking about? 
Yes. 
Q. That was the vote, as understood, it put 
the decision on whether Cache Valley, so to 
speak, was going to marry Western General? 
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A, That's correct. 
Q. You expected as you voted on that and it 
passed, to go to the membership, that if the 
membership passed it that the assets of Cache 
Valley Dairy would end up in IMPA? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And you also expected that Cache Valley 
Dairy would cease to function? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And that the members of Cache Valley 
Dairy Association would, so to speak, join 
the IMPA family? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And that henceforth, the decisions would 
be made by the IMPA board of directors and 
management? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And I assume you knew that as part of 
that IMPA would set some prices? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. I assume you'd been a member of a co-op 
long enough to know that some of the 
decisions that were made you'd like and some 
you wouldn't like? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And as of that point in time it had never 
crossed your mind, had it, Mr. Zilles, 
whether there was a legal distinction between 
a merger, consolidation, or transfer of 
assets? 
A. It never crossed my mind. Never even 
heard of those others. 
Q. All you knew was that if this thing 
passed, the assets of Cache Valley Dairy were 
going to end up by some means in IMPA? 
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A. That i s correct. 
Q. And isn't that, in fact, exactly what 
happened? 
m a : , s correct. 
Q* Your contention is not «tizh the fact that 
IMPA now has Cache Valley Dairyfs assets, 
it's simply that you understand that the 
merger statute wasn't followed? Is that 
true? 
A, That is true. And maybe I ought to 5^ tay 
that if the statute wasn't followed and it 
was illegal, I illegally transferred because 
I was '*..*? secretary. Myself and Bill 
Lirdlev 
Q. But your i;ole concern is how they got 
there , re *: tha - theyf re there? 
A. That is correct -" 
(Zilles Deposit i-r pages 2^-'?77:) 
At the conclusion of Mr. Zilles1 deposition,; some 
summary questions were asked and ^r- testified -ss v^ ..-. ^  
"Q. (MJk. CHRISTENSEN; /jr. Zilles, isn't it 
true that Cache Valley Dairy wanted out of 
this, among several tnings, but among those 
some of the major ones was an additional 
source of milk for their cheese plants and an 
access to grade A markets? 
MRe DAINES; I'm going t.- indulge you, and 
I'll stipulate that tne answer to that 
question is yes* w«-^  <--t * - have something 
new, 
THE WITNESS: Ask whatever >ou"ne leading up 
to* Everything youfve asked so far I know 
I've answered three times, I can deal 
through my lawyer that it's probably r.r.-e 
What *s your question? Please ask. 
MK ::HRISTENSENj _ iarz want you to 
tell me what you think your lawyer wants you 
to say T vrsrt '•"". *r'- -:e: me what is true, 
A, I've already answered those questions, 
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Mr. Christensen. Hey, you know, come on. 
Q. You've personally benefitted by going 
Grade A, have you not? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Do you have an estimate as to how many 
additional dollars you have realized since 
going grade A, that you would not have 
realized had you not gone grade A? 
A. I have not put a pencil to that, no. 
Q. It would be substantial, would it not? 
A. It would be an amount of money, yes. 
Q. Would it be more than $100,000? 
A. No, it would not be that much. 
Q. Would it be more than $50,000? 
A. Probably less. 
Q. But maybe in the range of $50,000? 
A. Somewhere around that area. 
Q. If you get what you want out of this 
lawsuit, as I understand it, Cache Valley 
Dairy will end up with the cheese plants 
back. Is that true? 
A. That's what we've asked. 
Q. But you're not planning to give your 
grade A status back, are you? 
A. Absolutely not. 
Q. And Cache Valley Dairy no longer needs 
the extra supply of milk from your perception 
because there's now milk surplus, is that 
true? 
A. There's plenty of milk around you. 
Q. So if you get what you want out of this 
lawsuit, the net effect is you're going to 
keep grade A status and Western General Dairy 
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a:, 1 c :\ t- :. t r, e i w c, c L -c,_-; -.. e going to lose 
what they bargained for in this deal. Is 
tha*- = r-i r statement? 
A. ' ^verythinu -:r:-. 3 in Alice in 
Wcnuerianu, that's probably true. 
Q. Do you have reason to believe that the 
representatives of these other co-ops didn't 
enter into this agreement i^ good faith? 
A. No, I do not." 
(Zilles Deposition t-M-:?*-• 
I ' , .;;-3J.; 1 , :•• Ziiies* own admissions tV,r m e 
members of lache Valley Dairy Association received, prerio- wnac 
they bargained fr* : - the - >; :•:• * -^L^rent 
t to - . . * •. rj-rKej to :neii benefit. By Mr. lilies' 
own admissions, their entire case LS not based on substance but 
merely on procedural technical i t i e*. pv e - M ir.fr; , . ^  : 
casH - T» ,-t '.tijj!-; •: e i.ia,. a;, attempt r*y d very small 
minority ,. f former Cache Valley Dairy members to reap a windfall 
at the expense of all of the other members of IMPA, who have 
dealt in '-:. • : ? -. J 
;: respectfully submitted that fairness and equity 
should net a^lcw st.;-. a result. 
Also ** -'^rr-r^*" *•- <"--.-. as Appellants urge, 
.-' - question the validity of numerous otre: co-
ops which arose from muLti-cooperative consolidations. fne 
resulting turmoil and damage would -.lear'y -:n' - -. .e public 
interest* 
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POINT IV, 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY PREPARED A 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE RULE 52(a), 
The court issued a memorandum decision on this case 
from which the order was prepared. This procedure is in direct 
compliance with Utah Rules of Procedure, Rule 52(a) (Addendum No. 
11). Rule 52(a) requires the Court to only issue a brief 
statement of the grounds for its decision and its Order. The 
Court is not required to enter specific findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in addition to its written memorandum 
decision. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 52(a) specifically 
states as follows: 
The trial court need not enter 
findings of fact and conclusions of 
law in ruling on motions, except as 
provided in Rule 41(b). The court 
shall, however, issue a brief 
written statement on the ground for 
its decision on all motions granted 
under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b) , 
and 56 and 59 when a motion is 
based on more than one ground, 
(emphasis added) 
Judge Christoffersen, of the First Judicial District 
Court, specifically followed Rule 52(a) in this matter, by 
issuing the brief written statement of the grounds for his 
decision and the Order. Specific findings of fact and 
conclusions of law are not required. 
Findings of fact and conclusions of law are also 
unnecessary for the Court's denial of the class certification. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule i- —-* -
as practi cable ail( commencement , . ^ a c : u L brought as a 
class action, the ^jurt shaj1 determine by order whether it is to 
b e ma Inta 1 ned . An c-*- A- r unde. .' *- ~ ' ITIH '(' be 
• - • .r amende . before ccc- decision on the 
writs' 1 Addendum - •. (~ tee r,,c itself sets ^r~-y all 
tnat is required by *hfi ^-.-y • . other 
the c.as- -. " ..». ;•..-!; -r ... ,uo: ;,ay thereafter be 
altered, --..r, amended r- anytime before t:;e final decision on the 
merits, ;t is very debatable whether denia*: * - '.lass .is even 
an gpcea.. ^ r. -- r * .— ^„„~ - * . c - specifically 
states that ,t may ce aiterec or amended before final decisi en on 
the merits and the lower Court expressly left ouen th :-;>.-• 
damages •«••- f )rther * : r, ., -• detailed 
Ciflcusci tnir=. iS^-^. see rtddendun- N O - incorporated 
herewith by reference) . 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, it is respect fully 
submitted that the decisior *r.i :^- "S~- ' * . •. 
b€ af:: , v - ~ i *e;.v:,
 v that t:ie appeal shoui:i be 
dismissed. 
DATED this i% day of May, 1988. 
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